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The Assertion of Statutory Rights Under FLSA 
and OSHA: Expand or Limit the Gardner- 
Denver Rationale 
Over two decades ago the United States Supreme Court in 
the famous Steelworkers Trilogy1 enunciated a federal policy 
favoring arbitration of labor disputes. Both the Supreme Court2 
and the National Labor Relations Board3 (NLRB) on different 
occasions have emphasized the importance of collective bargain- 
ing agreements and arbitration clauses by referring labor dis- 
putes arising under such agreements back to the parties for arbi- 
tration. For a number of years this presumption of arbitrability 
was thought to govern labor disputes of almost any kind that 
were covered under a valid collective bargaining agreement. The 
Supreme Court, however, altered the traditional notions con- 
cerning deferral and arbitration when it held in Alexander v. 
Gardner-Denver Co.' that the presumption of arbitrability does 
not extend to Title VIP cases. 
In the aftermath of Gardner-Denver, differences of opinion 
have arisen among the lower federal courts as to whether the 
Gardner-Denver rationale should be strictly limited to Title VII 
cases or expanded to encompass labor disputes arising under 
other legislation, specifically the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
193P (FLSA) and the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
19707 (OSHA). Some lower federal courts have relied upon 
Gardner-Denver to permit plaintiffs to exercise FLSA rights 
1. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. American'Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). 
2. See, e.g., Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 US. 235 (1970). 
3. See, e.g., Collyer Insulated Wire Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971). 
4. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
5. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 8s 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976). 
6. 29 U.S.C. 5s 201-219 (1976). 
7. 29 U.S.C. $5 651-678 (1976). 
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without first submitting to grievance-arbitration procedures8 
and to exercise OSHA rights following an aribtration award.@ In 
contrast, other courts have refused to extend the Gardner-Den- 
ver rationale to FLSA cases.1° This Comment focuses on 
whether the presumption of arbitrability should remain a gen- 
eral rule with a limited Title VII exception or whether the statu- 
torily created rights in FLSA and OSHA should exist indepen- 
dent of grievance-arbitration procedures, thereby warranting de 
novo consideration. The conclusion reached here is that the pre- 
sumption of arbitrability is displaced where Congress expressly 
creates independent, statutory rights. Consequently, FLSA and 
OSHA rights should not be subordinated to the grievance-arbi- 
tration machinery of collective bargaining agreements. 
A. Presumption of Arbitrability 
The federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes, ac- 
cording to the Supreme Court, is rooted in "congressional com- 
mand."ll The Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) pro- 
vides: "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the 
parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of 
grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation 
of an existing collective bargaining agreement."l9 The Supreme 
Court in Textile Workers Union u. Lincoln MillslS stated that 
the purpose behind this policy was to promote industrial peace 
and concluded that grievance-arbitration provisions in collective 
bargaining agreements further the achievement of this objec- 
tive." The Court's most emphatic pronouncement on the 
8. Leone v. Mobil Oil Corp., 523 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
9. Marshall v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 618 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1980). 
10. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 615 F.2d 1194 (8th Cir.), cert. 
granted, 101 S. Ct. 70 (1980); Satterwhite v. United Parcel Sew., Inc., 496 F.2d 448 (10th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974). 
11. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368,377 (1974). The Court 
identified section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. 
5 173(d) (1976), as the anchor for this "congressional command." Section 203, however, 
relates specifically to the functions of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. 
Subsection (d) declares that "a method agreed upon by the parties" is the "desirable 
method for settlement of grievance disputes," and that the Federal Mediation and Con- 
ciliation Service is available "only as a last resort." 
12. 29 U.S.C. 8 173(d) (1976) (this provision relates to the functions of the Federal 
Mediation and Conciliation Service). 
13. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
14. Id. at 455. 
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subject, which established the well-known presumption of arbi- 
trability, came in the 1960 Steelworkers Trilogy:l5 "An order to 
arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it 
may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is 
not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted 
dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage."16 
Although the Court did explain that this policy favoring griev- 
ance-arbitration procedures is essential to our "system of indus- 
trial self-government,"17 it never revealed the specific statutory 
basis of the policy.18 Instead the Court emphasized that arbitra- 
tion provides a body of private law to deal with unforeseeable 
problems that may arise, and also permits sufficient flexibility to 
accommodate the different interests and needs of the parties.lS 
15. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). 
16. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 
582-83 (1960) (footnote omitted). 
17. Id. at 581. 
18. Nowhere in the three decisions comprising the Steelworkers Trilogy does the 
Court cite a legislative enactment expressly declaring a federal policy favoring arbitra- 
tion of labor disputes. It is true that the Court in Gateway Coal, 414 U.S. 368, 377 
(1974), relied upon section 203(d) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. 173(d) (1976), as the statu- 
tory foundation for this federal policy; however, Gateway Coal was decided in 1974 and 
the Steelworkers Trilogy was decided fourteen years earlier. If section 203(d), which was 
enacted in 1947, in fact served as the statutory basis for the policy, it is difficult to 
explain why such an important point was not discussed or even cited in the Court's 
definitive Steelworkers Trilogy. 
19. The Court elaborated: 
The labor arbitrator's source of law is not confined to the express pro- 
visions of the contract, as the industrial common law-the practices of the 
industry and the shop--is equally a part of the collective bargaining agreement 
although not expressed in it. The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of 
the parties' confidence in his knowledge of the common law of the shop and 
their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear considerations which are 
not expressed in the contract as criteria for judgment. The parties expect that 
his judgment of a particular grievance will reflect not only what the contract 
says but, insofar as the collective bargaining agreement permits, such factors as 
the effect upon productivity of a particular result, its consequence to the mo- 
rale of the shop, his judgment whether tensions will be heightened or dimin- 
ished. For the parties' objective in using the arbitration process is primarily to 
further their common goal of uninterrupted production under the agreement, 
to make the agreement serve their specialized needs. The ablest judge cannot 
be expected to bring the same experience and competence to bear upon the 
determination of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly informed. 
U.S. at 581-82. 
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B. The Deferral Doctrine 
For many years the NLRB has adhered to a policy of defer- 
ring to the arbitral process. It first announced in Spielberg Man- 
ufacturing Co." its minimum standards test for deference to ar- 
bitration awards. The NLRB stated that it would recognize an 
arbitrator's award provided "the proceedings appear to have 
been fair and regular, all parties had agreed to be bound, and 
the decision of the arbitration panel is not clearly repugnant to 
the purposes and policies of the Act."" In addition to these 
three requirements, the NLRB in subsequent cases added a 
fourth criterion that the arbitrator must have considered the 
question that formed the basis for the unfair labor practice 
brought before the NLRB." The Spielberg deferral policy re- 
ceived favorable comment from the Supreme Courtgs and began 
finding acceptance in some pre-arbitral  situation^.^^ 
The NLRB added a significant dimension to the deferral 
doctrine when it held in Collyer Insulated Wires6 that disputes 
arising out of the meaning or application of a collective bargain- 
20. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). 
21. Id. a t  1082. 
22. Yourga Trucking, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 928 (1972); Airco Indus. Gases-Pacific, 
195 N.L.R.B. 676 (1972); Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883 (1963), enforcement denied on 
other grounds, 326 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1964); Monsanto Chem. Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 1097 
(1961). 
23. The Court in Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964), referred to 
the Spielberg deferral policy and then approvingly quoted this statement of the NLRB: 
There is no question that the Board is not precluded from adjudicating 
unfair labor practice charges even though they might have been the subject of 
an arbitration proceeding and award. Section 10(a) of the Act expressly makes 
this plain, and the courts have uniformly so held. However, it is equally well 
established that the Board has considerable discretion to respect an arbitration 
award and decline to exercise its authority over alleged unfair labor practices if 
to do so will serve the fundamental aims of the Act. 
The Act, as has repeatedly been stated, is primarily designed to promote 
industrial peace and stability by encouraging the practice and procedure of 
collective bargaining. Experience has demonstrated that collective-bargaining 
agreements that provide for final and binding arbitration of grievance and dis- 
putes arising thereunder, "as a substitute for industrial strife," contribute sig- 
nificantly to the attainment of this statutory objective. International Har- 
vester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 925-26. 
Id. at  271. 
24. See Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 141 (1969) (NLRB deferred action 
on alleged violations of fj 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act before parties had 
even resorted to the grievance-arbitration prdcedures of their collective bargaining agree- 
ment); Dubo Mfg. Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 431 (1963) (NLRB deferred action on alleged $ 
8(a)(3) violations pending completion of arbitration ordered by a district court). 
25. 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971). 
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ing agreement that have not been arbitrated may be referred by 
the NLRB to arbitration under the provisions of the parties' 
agreement. In Collyer a manufacturer and seller of insulated 
wire cable was charged with violating its duty as an employer to 
bargain under section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations 
Acts6 (NLRA) for allegedly having made unilateral changes in 
working conditions and wages." Although the contract between 
the parties permitted the employer to adjust the wages of its 
employees during the contract term and clearly provided that 
grievance-arbitration processes would be the exclusive forum for 
resolving contract disputes, the union had not invoked the griev- 
ance-arbitration machinery before bringing to the NLRB its un- 
fair labor practice charge against the employer. The NLRB con- 
cluded that the circumstances in Collyer "weigh[ed] heavily in 
favor of deferral,"28 and offered several reasons to support its 
decision: 
[Tlhis dispute arises within the confines of a long and produc- 
tive collective-bargaining relationship. The parties before us 
have, for 35 years, mutually and voluntarily resolved the con- 
flicts which inhere in collective bargaining. Here, as there, no 
claim is made of enmity by [the employer] to employees' exer- 
cise of protected rights. [The employer] here has credibly as- 
serted its willingness to resort to arbitration under a clause 
providing for arbitration in a very broad range of disputes and 
unquestionably broad enough to embrace this dispute. 
Finally, here, as in Schlitz, the dispute is one eminently 
well suited to resolution by arbitration. The contract and its 
meaning in present circumstances lie at the center of this 
disp~te.~' 
In refutation of a dissenting board member's characteriza- 
tion of deferral as instituting "compulsory arbitration" and al- 
lowing parties to be stripped of statutory rights?O the NLRB 
26. 29 U.S.C. $3 151-169 (1976). Section 8 (a)(5) of the NLRA is codified at 29 
U.S.C. $ 158(a)(5) (1976). 
27. The complaint alleged that the employer had unilaterally increased the wage 
rates for specific skilled maintenance employees, directed that a single maintenance ma- 
chinist rather than a team of two perform the worm gear removal and cleaning, and 
provided new wage rates for extruder operators. 192 N.L.R.B. at  837. 
28. Id. at 840. The NLRB also noted that neither the courts of appeals nor the 
Supreme Court had ever questioned its authority to exercise discretion and defer to the 
arbitral process. 
29. Id. at 842. 
30. Id. at 849 (Fanning, Member, dissenting). 
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majority stated that it was not compelling arbitration but 
"merely giving full effect to [the parties'] own voluntary agree- 
ments to submit all such disputes to arbitration, rather than 
permitting such agreements to be side-stepped and permitting 
the substitution of our processes, a forum not contemplated by 
their own agreement."s1 Terming its decision a "developmental 
step" in the treatment of pre-arbitral deferral cases, the NLRB 
dismissed the complaint but stated that it would retain jurisdic- 
tion for the sole purpose of insuring that the contractual griev- 
ance-arbitration procedure resolved the dispute in harmony with 
the Spielberg standards.32 
The year following the NLRB's decision in Collyer, the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Rios u. Reynolds Metals C O . ~ ~  
formulated a more rigorous version of the Spielberg deferral pol- 
icy for arbitration awards resolving Title VII disputes: 
First, there may be no deference to the decision of the arbitra- 
tor unless the contractual right coincides with rights under Ti- 
tle VII. Second, it must be plain that the arbitrator's decision 
is in no way violative of the private rights guaranteed by Title 
VII, nor of the public policy which inheres in Title VII. In ad- 
dition, before deferring, the district court must be satisfied 
that (1) the factual issues before it are identical to those de- 
cided by the arbitrator; (2) the arbitrator had power under the 
collective agreement to decide the ultimate issue of discrimina- 
tion; (3) the evidence presented at the arbitral hearing dealt 
31. 192 N.L.R.B. at 842. The NLRB majority answered the "stripping parties of 
statutory rights" argument by stating: 
When the parties have contractually committed themselves to mutually agree- 
able procedures for resolving their disputes during the period of the contract, 
we are of the view that those procedures should be afforded full opportunity to 
function. The long and successful functioning of grievance and arbitration pro- 
cedures suggests to us that in the overwhelming majority of cases, the utiliza- 
tion of such means will resolve the underlying dispute and make it unnecessary 
for either party to follow the more formal, and sometimes lengthy, combination 
of administrative and judicial litigation provided for under our statute. At the 
same time, by our reservation of jurisdiction, infra, we guarantee that there 
will be no sacrifice of statutory rights if the parties' own processes fail to func- 
tion in a manner consistent with the dictates of our law. This approach, we 
believe, effectuates the salutary policy announced in Spielberg. . . . 
Id. at 842-43. 
32. The NLRB retained its right to exercise jurisdiction upon a timely motion for 
reconsideration of the complaint based on a showing that the dispute was not amicably 
settled or not promptly submitted to arbitration, or that the grievance-arbitration proce- 
dure had not been fair or regular or had arrived at a result repugnant to the NLRA. Id. 
at 843. 
33. 467 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1972). 
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adequately with all factual issues; (4) the arbitrator actually 
decided the factual issues presented to the court; (5) the arbi- 
tration proceeding was fair and regular and free of procedural 
in fir mi tie^.^^ 
The Supreme Court subsequently held in Alexander v. 
Gardner-Denver CO.~' that a policy of deferral by federal courts 
to prior arbitral decisions in employment discrimination cases 
would not comport with Title VII congressional obje~tives?~ and 
accordingly rejected the Rios deferral standards. 
Concluding that Gardner-Denver only applied to cases in- 
volving claims of race or sex discrimination, the NLRB made 
clear in Electronic Reproduction Service C ~ r p . ~ ~  that it would 
continue to defer to arbitration under Collyer and S ~ i e l b e r g . ~ ~  
Although the Collyer deferral doctrine had been extended to 
NLRA section 8(a)(3) discrimination cases prior to Gardner- 
D e n ~ e r , ~ ~  Collyer was subsequently trimmed back to its original 
NLRA section 8(a)(5) dimensions in General American Trans- 
portation Corp.'O In contrast to the retrenchment of Collyer 
34. Id. a t  58. The court also ruled that the burden of proof for establishing that 
these conditions were met would be upon the respondent, not the claimant. Id. 
35. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
36. Id. a t  55-60. 
37. 213 N.L.R.B. 758 (1974). 
38. The NLRB majority concluded that its position was consistent with recent Su- 
preme Court pronouncements in Gardner-Denver and William E. Arnold Co. v. 
Carpenters Dist. Council, 417 U.S. 12 (1974). In Arnold the Court approvingly quoted 
the NLRB's following language from Collyer: 
[A]n industrial relations dispute may involve conduct which, a t  least arguably, 
may contravene both the collective agreement and our statute. When the par- 
ties have contractually committed themselves to mutually agreeable proce- 
dures for resolving their disputes during the period of the contract, we are of 
the view that those procedures should be afforded full opportunity to func- 
tion. . . . We believe it to be consistent with the fundamental objectives of 
Federal law to require the parties . . . to honor their contractual obligations 
rather than, by casting [their] dispute in statutory terms, to ignore their 
agreed-upon procedures. 
417 U.S. a t  16-17 (quoting Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 842-43 (1971)). 
39. National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972). 
40. 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977). In a three-to-two decision, then Chairperson Murphy 
cast the crucial vote and wrote in part: 
In cases alleging violations of Section 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3), based on conduct 
assertedly in derogation of the contract, the principal issue is whether the 
complained-of conduct is permitted by the parties' contract. Such issues are 
eminently suited to the arbitral process, and resolution of the contract issue by 
an arbitrator will, as a rule, dispose of the unfair labor practice issue. On the 
other hand, in cases alleging violations of Section 8(a)(l), 8(a)(3), 8(b)(l)(A), 
and 8(b)(2), although arguably also involving a contract violation, the determi- 
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pre-arbitral deference, the Spielberg doctrine was recently ex- 
panded by the Third Circuit in NLRB u. Pincus Bros., 
Inc.-M~xwell.~~ In Pincus Bros. the court denied enforcement 
of an NLRB reinstatement order and held that the NLRB's re- 
fusal to defer to an arbitration award, which had ruled that the 
employee had been terminated for cause, was an abuse of discre- 
t i ~ n . ' ~  The court further held that "it is an abuse of discretion 
for the Board to refuse to defer to an arbitration award where 
the findings of the arbitrator may arguably be characterized as 
not inconsistent with Board policy"4s and that "where there are 
two arguable interpretations of an arbitration award, one per- 
missible and one impermissible, the Board must defer to the de- 
cision rendered by the arbitrat~r."'~ The Third Circuit's decision 
native issue is not whether the conduct is permitted by the contract, but 
whether the conduct was unlawfully motivated or whether it otherwise inter- 
fered with, restrained, or coerced employees in the exercise of the rights guar- 
anteed them by Section 7 of the Act. In these situations, an arbitrator's resolu- 
tion of the contract issue will not dispose of the unfair labor practice 
allegation. Nor is the arbitration process suited for resolving employee com- 
plaints of discrimination under Section 7. 
Id. a t  810-11 (footnotes omitted). Murphy did indicate in General American, however, 
that she would follow Spielberg and uphold arbitration awards where the employee had 
voluntarily submitted to the arbitration or where an NLRB regional office had deferred 
to the award pursuant to the prevailing Collyer doctrine. Murphy then joined the two 
dissenting Board members of General American in Roy Robinson Chevrolet, 228 
N.L.R.B. No. 103 (1977), to reaffirm the NLRB's deferral to arbitration policy in NLRA 
Q 8(a)(5) cases. 
41. 620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1980). 
42. Id. at 370. The discharged employee in Pincus Bros., according to the arbitra- 
tor's decision, was terminated for cause because she had abused working time and had 
written and distributed a leaflet that was unfairly critical of employment conditions, the 
employer, and the employer's product. While the employee's grievance was pending, she 
filed a charge with the NLRB, alleging that she had been discharged for having engaged 
in concerted activity. The General Counsel issued a complaint and submitted to the 
NLRB the question whether the NLRB should defer to the arbitrator's award. An 
NLRB panel decided not to defer since it concluded that the employee had been dis- 
charged for having engaged in protected activity. After sending the matter to an admin- 
istrative law judge for a hearing, the NLRB adopted the administrative law judge's find- 
ings and conclusions that the employer had committed an unfair labor practice and 
ordered the employee's reinstatement. The NLRB then sought enforcement of its rein- 
statement order by the Third Circuit. Id. a t  370-71. 
43. Id. at 374. The court reasoned that NLRB deference to the arbitral process, 
"especially when the award has already been rendered and it is arguably consistent with 
Board policy, will effectuate the intent of the parties in the collective bargaining agree- 
ment and avoid the time, expense, and inconvenience of duplicative proceedings." Id. In 
addition, the court pointed out that when the parties agreed to establish and follow arbi- 
tration procedures, they voluntarily accepted the risk that the results of arbitration 
might differ from the NLRB's resolution of disputes. Id. 
44. Id. at 377. The court went to some length to articulate four reasons why the 
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in Pincus Bros. establishes a new high-water mark for the doc- 
trine of deferral. It should be remembered, however, that this 
recent hospitable accommodation by one court of appeals is a t  
present limited to section 8(a)(l) cases under the NLRA. 
In any event, the contours of the deferral doctrine remain in 
flux. Spirited debate continues among commentators about the 
appropriate role and scope of the deferral do~trine.'~ 
111. TITLE VII EXCEPTION TO THE DEFERRAL DOCTRINE: 
Gardner-Denver 
The Supreme Court placed an important limit on the ex- 
panding doctrine of deferral when it decided Alexander v. Gard- 
ner-Denver CO.'~ The Court held that an employee's Title VII 
right to a trial de novo is not foreclosed because his claim was 
earlier submitted to arbitration pursuant to the grievance-arbi- 
tration provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. In Gard- 
ner-Denver, the petitioner, a black who was training as a drill 
operator, was discharged for allegedly producing too many de- 
fective parts. Petitioner invoked the grievance-arbitration ma- 
chinery of the collective bargaining agreement, which arguably 
covered the dispute, to challenge his discharge. Although peti- 
tioner first contended in the final pre-arbitration step that his 
discharge was racially motivated, the arbitrator nevertheless 
ruled-without reference to the racial discrimination 
claim-"that petitioner had been 'discharged for just cause.' "" 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 
arbitrator's decision that the employee's conduct constituted unprotected activity was 
arguably correct: (I) Employees lose the protection of the NLRA when they make delib- 
erate or malicious false statements, (2) the employee's actions may have constituted un- 
protected disloyalty, (3) activity is unprotected if it is inconsistent with fundamental 
NLRA policy to promote collective bargaining and industrial stability, and (4) the em- 
ployee was not engaged in protected, concerted activity because she was acting alone. Id. 
at 375-77. 
45. See, e.g., Christensen, Private Judges, Public Rights: The Role of Arbitration in 
the Enforcement of the National Labor Relations Act, in THE FUTURE OF LABOR ARBI- 
TRATION IN AMERICA 49 (J. Correge, V. Hughes & M. Stone eds. 1976); Getman, Collyer 
Insulated Wire: A Case of Misplaced Modesty, 49 IND. L.J. 57 (1973); Zimmer, Wired 
for Collyer: Rationalizing NLRB and Arbitration Jurisdiction, 48 IND. L.J. 141 (1973). 
46. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
47. Id. at 42. At the arbitration hearing, petitioner's union introduced a letter from 
him stating that he was "knowledgeable that in the same plant others have scrapped an 
equal amount and sometimes in excess, but by all logical reasoning I . . . have been the 
target of preferential discriminatory treatment." Id. A union representative also gave 
testimony that the company's customary procedure in the case of unsatisfactory trainee 
drill operators was to return them to their former positions. Id. 
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which had received petitioner's charge of racial discrimination 
prior to the arbitration hearing, subsequently informed peti- 
tioner that it had no reasonable cause to believe that a violation 
of Title VII had occurred.48 Petitioner's private suit was dis- 
missed by the district court following the granting of the em- 
ployer's motion for summary j~dgrnent.'~ On appeal the Tenth 
Circuit affirmed per curium. The Supreme Court in a unanimous 
opinion, however, reversed the two lower courts. 
There were several conclusions that the Supreme Court 
could have reached in Gardner-Denver. I t  could have affirmed 
the Tenth Circuit's opinion, which adopted a preclusion 
rule60-i.e., an employee's prior submission of a claim to final 
arbitration precludes de novo consideration of the claim in the 
federal courts. At the other extreme, the Court could have 
adopted a rule ensuring unconditional de novo consideration of 
an employee's Title VII claim. Finally, the Court could have se- 
lected a compromise position incorporating the deferral doctrine 
in either a lax (Spielberg) or a more rigid (Rios) form. Instead, 
the Court fashioned a novel approach. Until the last paragraph 
of the opinion, every indicator suggested that the Court had to- 
tally rejected the deferral doctrine and adopted a pure de novo 
consideration rule. Without explanation, however, the Court 
simply directed that "[tlhe arbitral decision may be admitted as 
evidence and accorded such weight as the court deems appropri- 
ate? The accompanying footnote, number twenty-one, merely 
adds: 
We adopt no standards as to the weight to be accorded an 
arbitral decision, since this must be determined in the court's 
discretion with regard to the facts and circumstances of each 
case. Relevant factors include the existence of provisions in the 
collective-bargaining agreement that conform substantially 
with Title VII, the degree of procedural fairness in the arbitral 
forum, adequacy of the record with respect to the issue of dis- 
48. Id. at 43. The EEOC later informed petitioner of his right to bring suit in fed- 
eral district court within 30 days. Id. 
49. Id. at 43. The district court, relying upon petitioner's aKidavit, which stated that 
he had raised the racial discrimination claim in the arbitration hearing, found that the 
claim had been presented to the arbitrator and resolved adversely to petitioner. The 
court then held under an election of remedies notion that petitioner was bound by the 
arbitration award and precluded from bringing suit under Title VII because he had vol- 
untarily elected to pursue his grievance by arbitration. Id. 
50. Id. at 54-55. 
51. Id. at 60. 
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crimination, and the special competence of particular arbitra- 
tors. Where an arbitral determination gives full consideration 
to an employee's Title VII rights, a court may properly accord 
it great weight. This is especially true where the issue is solely 
one of fact, specifically addressed by the parties and decided 
by the arbitrator on the basis of an adequate record. But 
courts should ever be mindful that Congress, in enacting Title 
VII, thought it necessary to provide a judicial forum for the 
ultimate resolution of discriminatory employment claims. It is 
the duty of courts to assure the full availability of this forum.62 
Professor Harry T. Edwards has noted that "[dlespite the 
emphasis in Gardner-Denver on maintaining full federal adjudi- 
cation of Title VII rights, footnote twenty-one seems to offer 
lower courts a route to de facto deferral to arbitral awards."6s 
However, it is still too early to detect a trend in the federal judi- 
ciary on the weight being accorded arbitral decisions under foot- 
note twenty-one.54 
An understanding of the Court's analysis and rationale in 
Gardner-Denver is essential for the purposes of this Comment 
since the central inquiry here is whether the Court's de novo 
consideration approach, which allows the arbitration decision to 
be admissible as evidence, should also govern statutory rights 
arising under FLSA and OSHA. The Court began from the pre- 
mise that Title VII does not directly address "the relationship 
between federal courts and the grievance-arbitration machinery 
of collective bargaining agreements."" In the absence of express 
congressional guidance, the Court relied on four main considera- 
tions in reaching its decision: (1) Congress vested the federal 
courts with plenary power for enforcement of Title VII rights, 
(2) Congress intended to accord parallel or overlapping remedies 
against discrimination, (3) arbitrators have authority to resolve 
52. Id. at 60 n.21. For a detailed analysis of the Court's admissible as evidence doc- 
trine, see Richards, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver: A Threat to Title VII Rights, 29 ARK. 
L. REV. & BAR ASSOC. J. 129 (1975). 
53. Edwards, Labor Arbitration At The Crossroads: The "Common Law of the 
Shop" u. External Law, 32 ARB. J. 65, 77 (1977) [hereinafter cited as At the Crossroads]. 
54. In Strittmatter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 496 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1974), 
the Sixth Circuit remanded under Gardner-Denver without referring to footnote 21: 
"Alexander requires us to reverse the judgment of the District Court and to remand for 
a trial de novo, in which the arbitral award may be admitted in evidence and accorded 
such weight as the Court deems appropriate." Id. at 1245. The Fifth Circuit in Jones v. 
Supreme Sugar Refinery, 493 F.2d 1354 (5th Cir. 1974), simply remanded by citing 
Gardner-Denver and not commenting on the weight to be accorded. 
55. 415 U.S. at 47. 
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only contractual rights, not Title VII substantive rights, even if 
such rights are duplicative, and (4) arbitral processes are com- 
paratively inferior to judicial processes in protecting Title VII 
rights. 
With respect to the first consideration the Court stressed 
several times in its opinion that Congress had assigned plenary 
powers to the federal courts to secure compliance with Title VII. 
Broad remedial powers were entrusted to the federal courts in 
part because the EEOC does not possess direct powers of 
enf~rcement .~~  
Secondly, the Court concluded that because Congress' pol- 
icy against discrimination was of the "highest priority," its legis- 
lation demonstrated a general intent to provide parallel or over- 
lapping remedies." Accordingly, the Court rejected the lower 
courts' reliance on the doctrines of election of remedies and 
~aiver~~-doctrines that necessarily limit the scope of relief 
available to a claimant. 
As a third consideration the Court determined that an arbi- 
trator's authority extends to only the resolution of contractual 
rights, not statutory rights, even if these rights are similar to 
those protected under Title VII? In other words, contractual 
and statutory rights have "legally independent origins," and the 
"distinctly separate nature" of these rights is not removed just 
because the same factual setting is involved. The arbitrator's 
grant of authority to resolve disputes is rooted solely in the col- 
lective bargaining agreement itself and his decision must be 
based on a fair interpretation of the terms and application of 
that agreement?O 
56. Id. at 44. It  is beyond the power of the EEOC to adjudicate claims or impose 
administrative sanctions. Plenary enforcement powers for Title VII are vested in the 
federal courts. 42 U.S.C. $5 2000e-5(f), & (g) (1976) authorize federal courts to provide 
injunctive relief or other such affirmative action as may be required to remedy the effects 
of discriminatory employment practices. 
57. Id. at 47. For examples of other statutory relief available, see 42 U.S.C. 5 1981 
(1976) (Civil Rights Act of 1866); 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 (1976) (Civil Rights Act of 1871). 
58. The Court noted that most courts recognize that the election of remedies doc- 
trine does not apply to suits under Title VII. 415 U.S. at 49 n.11. Furthermore, the Court 
ruled, "there can be no prospective waiver of an employee's rights under Title VII." Id. 
a t  51. 
59. 415 U.S. at 53-54. 
60. The Court found support for this conclusion in the writings of Dean Schulman: 
A proper conception of the arbitrator's function is basic. He is not a public 
tribunal imposed upon the parties by superior authority which the parties are 
obliged to accept. He has no general charter to administer justice for a commu- 
nity which transcends the parties. He is rather part of a system of self-govern- 
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These first three factors primarily explain why the Court 
elected not to follow the Tenth Circuit's strict preclusion rule in 
Title VII cases. Strict preclusion would prevent claimants from 
seeking supplemental relief apart from that obtained through 
the grievance-arbitration machinery. In addition, the foreclosure 
of these parallel avenues of statutory relief would frustrate Con- 
gress' purpose in conferring plenary powers upon the federal 
courts for the enforcement of Title VII rights. 
In the final section of its opinion, the Court developed its 
fourth proposition that arbitral processes are comparatively in- 
ferior to judicial processes in protecting rights secured by Title 
VII. In this last section the Court specifically explained its rejec- 
tion of a deferral policy. "Arbitral procedures," stated the Court, 
"while well suited to the resolution of contractual disputes, 
make arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the 
final resolution of rights created by Title V11."61 An arbitrator's 
role is to effectuate the parties' intent, not enforce statutory re- 
quirements. The weakness of this conclusion, however, is that 
"the tension between contractual and statutory objectives may 
be mitigated where a collective-bargaining agreement contains 
provisions facially similar to those of Title V11."62 Having under- 
cut its own argument with this acknowledgment, the Court de- 
clared that "other facts . . . render arbitral processes compara- 
tively inferior to judicial processes in $he protection of Title VII 
rights."63 In short, these "other facts" include the arbitrator's 
special competence relating "to the law of the shop, not the law 
of the land."" Although arbitrators may be especially knowl- 
edgeable with respect to "industrial relations," courts are better 
qualified to deal with "statutory and constitutional issues" as 
well as "public law concepts." Moreover, the procedural infor- 
mality of arbitration, concluded the Court, makes it a "less 
appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII issues than 
the federal courts."66 
ment created by and confined to theGparties. He serves their pleasure only, to 
administer the rule of law established by their qollective agreement. Schulman, 
Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1016 
(1955). 
Id. at 53 n.16. 
61. Id. at 56. 
62. Id. at 57. 
63. Id. (emphasis added). 
64. Id. at 57. 
65. Id. at 58. 
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In scrutinizing the Gardner-Denver opinion to determine 
whether the Court's holding should be extended to FLSA and 
OSHA rights, several points should be kept in mind. First, the 
Court acknowledged, but in no way disparaged, the federal pol- 
icy favoring arbitration of labor disputes. Most importantly, 
apart from all its previous reasoning earlier in the opinion, the 
Court stated a t  the end that it was "accommodating" federal 
policies-specifically "the federal policy favoring arbitration of 
labor disputes and the federal policy against discriminatory em- 
ployment pra~t ices . "~~ In the Court's judgment, the best accom- 
modation of these two important federal policies was to allow 
employees to pursue remedies under both grievance-arbitration 
processes and Title VII. 
IV. PRESUMPTION OF ARBITRABILITY EXTENDS TO SAFETY 
DISPUTES-Gateway Coal 
Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workerss7 was decided 
by the Supreme Court in an eight-to-one decision the same year 
Gardner-Denver was decided. As in Gardner-Denver, Justice 
Powell wrote for the majority in Gateway Coal. The dispute in 
Gateway Coal arose when the coal company reinstated certain 
foremen who were suspended for falsifying records indicating 
airflow levels in the mine? The miners struck to protest the 
safety hazard created by the presence of the reinstated foremen. 
Following the union's refusal to arbitrate, the company sought 
and obtained from the district court an injunction against the 
striking miners. On appeal a divided panel of the Third Circuit 
reversed and vacated the injunction. The court of appeals found 
that public policy disfavored compulsory arbitration of safety 
disputess9 and that in the absence of an express agreement to 
submit such disputes to arbitration, "the union had no contrac- 
tual duty to submit this controversy to arbitration and hence no 
# 
66. Id. at 59. 
67. 414 U.S. 368 (1974). 
68. The collapse of a ventilation structure, which partially blocked an intake airway, 
resulted in an airflow of less than half the normal rate. Nonetheless, even with the re- 
duced airflow, ventilation in the mine still exceeded state and federal requirements. Id. 
at 370 & n.1. 
69. The court of appeals reasoned that where employees refuse to work because of a 
"good faith apprehension of physical danger," no sound reason exists for "requiring them 
to subordinate their judgment to that of an arbitrator." 466 F.2d 1157, 1160 (3d Cir. 
1972). 
3611 FLSA AND OSHA 375 
implied obligation not to strike."70 
In reversing the Third Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court 
first determined that the arbitration provision of the collective 
bargaining agreement was sufficiently broad to govern the safety 
dispute.71 The Court next concluded that the presumption of 
arbitrability applies to safety disputes: 
We think these remarks [quoted from the Steelworkers Tril- 
ogyT2] are as applicable to labor disputes touching the safety of 
the employees as to other varieties of disagreement. Certainly 
industrial strife may as easily result from unresolved contro- 
versies on safety matters as from those on other subjects, with 
the same unhappy consequences of lost pay, curtailed produc- 
tion, and economic instability. Moreover, the special expertise 
of the labor arbitrator, with his knowledge of the common law 
of the shop, is as important to the one case as to the other, and 
the need to consider such factors as productivity and worker 
morale is as readily apparent.73 
The significance of Gateway Coal is that the Court applied 
the presumption of arbitrability to safety disputes because it de- 
termined that arbitrators, by virtue of their "special expertise" 
and "knowledge of the common law of the shop," are especially 
well suited for the resolution of safety disputes. However, the 
facts in Gateway Coal are readily distinguishable from those in 
Gardner-Denver in two important respects: Gateway Coal, un- 
like Gardner-Denver, involved neither a separate statutory vio- 
lation nor a prior arbitration award. 
V. CASES EXTENDING Gardner-Denver Beyond Title VII to 
FLSA and OSHA: Leone AND N.L. Industries 
A. Leone 
One of the first cases to extend the Gardner-Denver de novo 
consideration rule beyond Title VII to FLSA and OSHA was the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir- 
cuit's decision in Leone v. Mobil Oil C ~ r p . ~ ~  Unlike Gardner- 
Denver, Leone was a pre-arbitral award case in which the pri- 
70. 414 U.S. at 373. 
71. Id. at 376. The arbitration provision stated in part that the duty to arbitrate 
extended to "any local trouble of any kind aris[ing] at the mine." Id. 
72. 363 U.S. at 581-82. 
73. 414 U.S. at 379. 
74. 523 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
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mary issue was whether employees were required to exhaust the 
grievance-arbitration machinery of their collective bargaining 
agreement before bringing suit against their employer for alleged 
violation of their statutory rights. The dispute arose when fed- 
eral inspectors went to a Mobil refinery in response to a union 
complaint to investigate conditions at the refinery which alleg- 
edly violated OSHA health and safety r eg~ la t ions .~The  four 
plaintiff employees accompanied the inspectors during regular 
working hours on various phases of the inspection, which lasted 
over the course of several weeks. Midway through the inspec- 
tion, Mobil ceased compensating plaintiffs for their participation 
in the i n spe~ t ion .~~  Plaintiffs' union subsequently filed a com- 
plaint with the Secretary of Labor in which it alleged that the 
employer's cessation of payments to the employees because of 
their participation in the inspection violated OSHA's ban 
against discriminatory treatment of employees who exercise 
their OSHA rights? The Assistant Secretary of Labor rejected 
the union's claim on the ground that refusal to compensate for 
"walkaround" time is neither discriminatory per se under OSHA 
nor compensable under FLSA's "hours worked" test.78 
Plaintiffs next brought suit in the United States District 
75. The inspection was conducted pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 5 657 (f)(l) (1976), which 
states: 
Any employees or representative of employees who believe that a violation 
of a safety or health standard exists that threatens physical harm, or that an 
imminent danger exists, may request an inspection by giving notice to the Sec- 
retary [of Labor] or his authorized representative of such violation or dan- 
ger. . . . If upon receipt of such notification the Secretary determines there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that such violation or danger exists, he shall 
make a special inspection in accordance with the provisions of this section as 
soon as practicable. 
As a result of the inspection, Labor Department officials cited Mobil for three "serious" 
and ninety "non-serious" violations. 523 F.2d at 1154. 
76. Mobil management representatives who participated in the inspection, however, 
continued to receive pay for the entire period. Id. 
77. 29 U.S.C. 5 660(c)(l) (1976) provides: 
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any em- 
ployee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused 
to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter or has testified 
or is about to testify in any such proceeding or because of the exercise by such 
employee on behalf of himself or others of any right afforded by this chapter. , 
78. 523 F.2d at 1155. The so-called "hours worked" test is derived from the follow- 
ing FLSA provision: "Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any 
workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce . . . [a 
minimum wage] at the following rates . . . ." 29 U.S.C. 5 206(a) (1976). 
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Court for the District of C o l ~ m b i a , ~ ~  but the court granted Mo- 
bil's motion for summary judgment, holding that because the 
employees' participation was voluntary and primarily for their 
own benefit, they were not entitled to compensation under the 
"hours worked" test.80 On appeal the District of Columbia Cir- 
cuit resolved for the first time Mobil's claim that employees 
seeking to vindicate statutory rights must first exhaust the 
grievance-arbitration procedures specified in the collective bar- 
gaining agreement. The court of appeals rejected the exhaustion 
argument and then affirmed the district court's decision. 
In reaching its decision, the District of Columbia Circuit 
noted that the presumption of arbitrability had been expanded 
in Gateway Coal to encompass safety disputes, but, disturbingly, 
the court never attempted to distinguish Gateway Coal's arbi- 
tration requirements from the safety-related dispute in Leone. % 
Perhaps the court ignored the apparent inconsistency because it 
viewed Leone strictly as an FLSA "hours worked" case and dis- 
counted the fact that the alleged safety violations had precipi- 
tated the wage dispute. 
In any event, the court proceeded to limit the exhaustion of 
remedies doctrine by relying upon two strands of Supreme Court 
authority. The first line of cases relied upon began with U.S. 
Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. A r g ~ e l l e s , ~ ~  where the Supreme Court re- 
affirmed the rule favoring use of grievance-arbitration machinery 
but limited its application with respect to individuals. The 
Court held there that section 301 of the LMRA neither abro- 
gated nor replaced an individual seaman's statutory claim for 
wages;82 rather, section 301 merely provided an optional rem- 
e d ~ . ~ ~  The second strand of precedent was naturally Gardner- 
79. Plaintiffs brought suit pursuant to the provisions of § 301(a) of the LMRA, 29 
U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976). It should be noted that at least one court, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, has found that no private right of action exists 
under section ll(c)(l) of OSHA, 29 U.S.C. $ 660(c) (1976). Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616 
F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1980). 
80. 523 F.2d at 1155. 
81. 400 US. 351 (1971). See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (employee per- 
mitted to sue directly for wrongful discharge without exhausting grievance procedures 
since union had breached its duty of fair representation). 
82. 46 U.S.C. $ 596 (1976). 
83. The Leone court stated: 
What Congress has plainly granted we hesitate to deny. Since the history of $ 
301 is silent on the abrogation of existing statutory remedies of seamen in the 
maritime field, we construe it to provide only an optional remedy to them. We 
would require much more to hold that $ 301 reflects a philosophy of legal com- 
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Denver. The court of appeals, capitalizing on familiar reasoning, 
stressed that both the Title VII and FLSA statutory schemes 
evidence a congressional intent that such rights be judicially en- 
forced. In addition, the court concluded-much as the Supreme 
Court earlier had concluded-that because FLSA, like Title VII, 
consists of statutorily created rights, an arbitrator, whose au- 
thority stems solely from the agreement between the parties, 
"cannot be the final arbiter of rights created by statute."" 
Although the court of appeals in Leone drew upon two rep- 
utable strands of recent Supreme Court precedent, the court's 
decision has been criticized for misplaced reliance on both 
Arguelles and Gardner-Denver? The essence of the criticism, 
which merits serious consideration, is that in light of Gateway 
Coal, where the Supreme Court endorsed arbitration of safety 
disputes and extolled the special expertise of arbitrators who are 
versed in the common law of the shop, FLSA wage claims are 
more closely aligned to Gateway-type safety concerns than to 
Title VII discrimination claims. Hence, the argument concludes, 
"FLSA wage claims should be subject to the exhaustion of griev- 
ances requirement."" I t  is unnecessary to deal with this argu- 
ment at present since it merely sets the stage for the analysis to 
follow. 
B. N.L. Industries 
A recent Seventh Circuit case, Marshall u. N.L. Industries, 
I ~ C . , ~ '  is in one respect factually closer to Gardner-Denver than 
Leone. N.L. Industries and Gardner-Denver both involved the 
assertion of statutory rights following a prior arbitration award. 
In N.L. Industries an employee who refused to work under al- 
legedly unsafe conditions was d i s~ha rged .~~  The employee filed a 
pulsion that overrides the explicit judicial remedy provided by 46 U.S.C. 5 596. 
523 F.2d a t  1157 (quoting U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 357-58 
(1971)). 
84. 523 F.2d at 1159. 
85. 10 GA. L. REV. 843, 853-55 (1976). 
86. Id. a t  855. 
87. 618 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1980). 
88. The employee worked as a payloader operator and was assigned to load lead 
scrap into a melting kettle. As he began to dump the lead scrap, the employee observed 
that the dross in the kettle had separated from the side of the pot, thereby exposing to 
view the molten metal beneath. Only the week before similar conditions had resulted in 
the exploding and spraying of the molten lead toward the employee's enclosed cab. Be- 
cause he now lacked a windshield and an enclosed cab, the employee feared that an 
explosion might again occur and cause him injury. Accordingly, he immediately ceased 
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written grievance under the collective bargaining agreement be- 
tween his union and his employer8@ and also filed a complaint 
with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, alleg- 
ing that he had been discharged in violation of OSHA's anti- 
discrimination provisi~n.~~ The employee's grievance progressed 
through final arbitration where he was awarded reinstatement 
with "unimpaired seniority" but without back pay.@' The em- 
ployee accepted the company's offer to return to work. 
The Secretary of Labor subsequently filed suit in district 
court pursuant to section ll(c)(2) of OSHAea and sought a vari- 
ety of supplemental remedies." The district court granted the 
defendant company's motion for summary judgment, concluding 
that despite the controlling precedent of Gardner-Denver, an 
exception existed in this case because the employee voluntarily 
waived his right to statutory relief by accepting the arbitration 
award and returning to work without back pay. 
On appeal the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court 
that Gardner-Denver controlled the question whether a prior ar- 
working. The employee was suspended-and ultimately discharged-for his refusal to 
finish his work with the unprotected payloader after having been ordered to do so by his 
supervisor. Id. at 1221-22. 
89. The pertinent provision of the collective bargaining agreement stated: "No em- 
ployee shall be required or permitted by the company to work under unusual conditions 
that are dangerous to life, limb or health, nor to work on a machine or use other equip- 
ment which does not meet normal safety standards." Id. at 1222 n.4. 
90. 29 U.S.C. 8 660(c)(l) (1976). Section ll(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. 8 660(c)(2) (1976), au- 
thorizes the Secretary of Labor to institute actions to enjoin or redress such 
discrimination. 
91. The arbitrator concluded that this was the appropriate relief because he deter- 
mined that the N.L. Industries supervisor had properly checked the heat of the kettle 
and decided that the work could proceed safely. 618 F.2d at 1222. 
92. The statute provides: 
Any employee who believes that he has been discharged or otherwise dis- 
criminated against by any person in violation of this subsection may, within 
thirty days after such violation occurs, file a complaint with the Secretary al- 
leging such discrimination. Upon receipt of such complaint, the Secretary shall 
cause such investigation to be made as he deems appropriat& If upon such 
investigation, the Secretary determines that the provisions of this subsection 
have been violated, he shall bring an action in any appropriate United States 
district court against such person. In any such action the United States district 
courts shall have jurisdiction, for cause shown to restrain violations of para- 
graph (1) of this subsection and order all appropriate relief including rehiring 
or reinstatement of the employee to his former position with back pay. 
29 U.S.C. 8 660(c)(2) (1976). 
93. The relief sought included a permanent injunction against further violations, 
back pay and vacation pay for the employee, and the posting of a prescribed notice. 618 
F.2d at 1222. 
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bitration award bars de novo consideration of the claim in the 
federal courts. The court likened OSHA to Title VII in that both 
legislative schemes were enacted by Congress with the aim of 
mobilizing the federal government's resources to attack specific 
types of problems that affected workers throughout the country. 
Emphasizing the recurring motif that Congress intended indi- 
viduals to be able to find full vindication of their statutory 
rights in the federal judiciary, the court observed: 
Enacted after the Supreme Court developed its policies en- 
couraging deference to arbitration in a pure collective bargain- 
ing context, the OSHA legislation was intended to create a sep- 
arate and general right of broad social importance existing 
beyond the parameters of an individual labor agreement and 
susceptible of full vindication only in a judicial f o r ~ r n . ~  
In addition, the Seventh Circuit added a new variation to 
the supplemental remedies reasoning by pointing out that an ar- 
bitrator cannot always grant the wide range of relief that the 
courts can. In N.L. Industries, for instance, the arbitrator could 
not order the notice remedies and broad injunctive relief that 
the Secretary of Labor sought. 
In holding Gardner-Denver controlling, the court of appeals 
failed, as in Leone, to consider whether the Gateway presump- 
tion of arbitrability over safety disputes should have any bearing 
in an OSHA case where an employee's safety is the issue that 
prompts the suit. Without regard for or perhaps awareness of 
that important question, the court of appeals proceeded to re- 
verse the district court on the waiver question since it concluded 
that absent other proof of an intent to waive one's statutory 
rights, mere acceptance of an arbitration award is insufhient to 
show such intent? 
94. Id. 
95. The court observed that the Supreme Court in Gardner-Denver had concluded 
that the mere submission of a grievance to arbitration does not alone constitute waiver. 
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that "[aln employee should not have to refuse reinstate- 
ment ordered by an arbitrator and thereby risk losing his job permanently in order to 
exercise his statutory right to seek judicial relief with all the riska that it may entail." Id. 
at 1223. 
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VI. CASES LIMITING THE SCOPE OF Gardner-Denver to Title 
VII: Satterwhite AND Barrentine 
A. Satterwhite 
Only a few courts of appeals have had occasion to address 
the question whether the Gardner-Denver rationale ought to be 
extended to statutory rights secured by FLSA and OSHA. The 
Tenth Circuit-the same court of appeals that was reversed by 
the Supreme Court in Gardner-Denver-took the position in 
Satterwhite v. United Parcel Service, I ~ C . @ ~  that Gardner-Den- 
ver should be limited to the Title VII context. 
Like the courts in Gardner-Denver and N.L. Industries, the 
court in Satterwhite considered whether an individual may exer- 
cise a statutory right following submission of a claim to final ar- 
bitration. The source of controversy in Satterwhite was the em- 
ployer's decision to eliminate two previously paid fifteen minute 
coffee breaks. The employees filed a grievance under the collec- 
tive bargaining agreement to recover pay for the extra half hour 
they were working each day.@' The company refused the union's 
demand for arbitration on the ground that coffee breaks were 
not covered under the labor contract. The union brought suit in 
district court and obtained an order compelling the company to 
arbitrate. The arbitrator later ruled that the company's unilat- 
eral elimination of the coffee breaks was wrongful and directed 
that the employees be paid for an additional half hour per day 
for the period in question. Contrary to the union's wishes, how- 
ever, the arbitrator set the rate of pay at straight time, not over- 
time? Following the company's payment of the award, em- 
ployee Satterwhite, on behalf of himself and fifty-eight others, 
brought suit under section 16(b) of the FLSAee to recover time- 
96. 496 F.2d 448 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974). 
97. Id. at 448-49. 
98. Id. at 449. 
99. Section 16(b) provides: 
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of 
this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of 
their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the 
case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Action 
to recover such liability may be maintained against any employer (including a 
public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any 
one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other 
employees similarly situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any 
such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and 
such consent is fled in the court in which such action is brought. The court in 
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and-a-half pay for work in excess of forty hours per week.loO 
Based on the authority of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Gard- 
ner-Denver, which had not yet been reversed by the Supreme 
Court, the district court held the arbitration award to be dispos- 
itive and dismissed the action. 
On appeal the Tenth Circuit prefaced its analysis by 
stressing that a statutory claim under FLSA for overtime pay is 
clearly distinct from a statutory right protecting against employ- 
ment discrimination. Following a brief summary of the Supreme 
Court's analysis in the recently decided Gardner-Denver case, 
the court set forth its reasons why Gardner-Denver should be 
distinguished from Satterwhite. 
Because FLSA does not include procedures that accentuate 
either private enforcement, or overlapping or parallel relief, the 
court inferred "a greater reliance on contract remedies and a 
lesser emphasis on individual enforcement" under FLSA.lol In 
search of further evidence of congressional intent on the subject, 
the court turned to the Portal-to-Portal Act of 19471°3 and 
found that this legislation was enacted because of Congress' dis- 
satisfaction with judicial interpretation of FLSA. The court 
seemed to find a certain talismanic charm in the declared con- 
gressional policy "to protect the right of collective bargaining 
. . . and limit the jurisdiction of the courts."lo8 
such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or 
plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and 
costs of the action. The right provided by this subsection to bring an action by 
or on behalf of any employee, and the right of any employee to become a party 
plaintiff to any such action, shall terminate upon the filing of a complaint by 
the Secretary of Labor in an action under section 217 of this title in which 
restraint is sought of any further delay in the payment of unpaid minimum 
wages, or the amount of unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, 
owing to such employee under section 206 or section 207 of this title by an 
employer liable therefor under provisions of this subsection. 
29 U.S.C. 3 216(b) (1976). 
100. The governing statutory provision states: 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall employ 
any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the 
production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in 
commerce, or in the production of goods for commerce, for a workweek longer 
than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employ- 
ment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one- 
half times the regular rate at  which he is employed. 
29 U.S.C. 5 207(a)(l) (1976). 
101. 496 F.2d at 450. 
102. 29 U.S.C. 95 251-262 (1976). 
103. 29 U.S.C. 5 251(b) (1976). 
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The court's reliance on this language in the Portal-to-Portal 
Act is imaginative but misleading, if not totally unsound. Con- 
gress' intent becomes very clear when the legislation is viewed in 
its historical context. In a line of important cases decided by the 
Supreme Court in the mid-1940's,lW the Court subjected em- 
ployers and the government to immense liability by ruling that 
certain preliminary and incidental employment activi- 
ties-generally regarded at the time to be non-compensable un- 
less otherwise agreed by the parties-constituted compensable 
"workweek" time. The federal courts were immediately flooded 
with suits; the claimed and potential liability of private employ- 
ers and the government was staggering.lo6 Congress enacted the 
Portal-to-Portal Act for the specific purpose of eliminating the 
unexpected, retroactive liabilities. The legislation removed from 
both state and federal courts jurisdiction to consider claims 
seeking to impose such retroactive liability.lM This historical 
perspective shows that Congress' declared purpose was to pro- 
tect employers' interests in the existing collective bargaining 
agreements and to limit the jurisdiction of the courts with re- 
spect to retroactive liability. 
The court of appeals proffered one of its strongest argu- 
ments, however, when it stated: "Wages and hours are at the 
heart of the collective-bargaining process. They are more akin to 
collective rights than to individual rights, and are more suitable 
to the arbitral process than Title VII rights."lo7 The Tenth Cir- 
104. Anderson v. Mount Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946); Jewell Ridge 
Coal Corp. v. Local 6167, United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 161 (1945); Tennessee Coal Co. 
v. Muscoda Local, 321 U.S. 590 (1944). 
105. Between July 1,1946, and Jan. 31, 1947, 1,930 actions based on the Tennessee 
Coal, Jewell Ridge and Mt. Clemens Pottery cases were commenced in the federal 
courts. The combined claims in these actions exceeded five billion dollars. The federal 
government's potential liability on War Department cost-plus contracts alone was esti- 
mated at 1.4 billion dollars. See H.R. R.EP. NO. 71, 80th Cong., 1st Seas. 3,4,5 (1947); see 
also S. REP. NO. 48, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). 
106. The statute provides: 
No court of the United States, of any State, Territory, or possession of the 
United States, or of the District of Columbia, shall have jurisdiction of any 
action or proceeding, whether instituted prior to or on or after May 14, 1947, 
to enforce liability or impose punishment for or on account of the failure of the 
employer to pay minimum wages or overtime compensation under the Fair La- 
bor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, under the Walsh-Healey Act, or under 
the Bacon-Davis Act, to the extent that such action or proceeding seeks to 
enforce any liability or impose any punishment with respect to an activity 
which was not compensable under subsections (a) and (b) of this section. 
29 U.S.C. 8 252(d) (1976). 
107. 496 F.2d at  451. The court further reasoned: "The ever-present disputes over 
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cuit also presented a persuasive argument when it shifted the 
focus to balancing competing federal policies. The court noted 
that the Supreme Court in Gardner-Denver weighed the federal 
policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes and the federal pol- 
icy against discrimination which ranked as one of "highest prior- 
ity." Arbitration gave way to anti-discrimination policy. The 
Satterwhite court did not reach the balancing stage, which 
would have pitted the policy favoring arbitration of labor dis- 
putes against a policy arguably favoring judicial consideration of 
individual FLSA claims, because it concluded that no FLSA fo- 
rum preference existed for the resolution of wage disputes: 
We find nothing in any pertinent legislative history or court 
decision to indicate that Congress, by the grant of a right to 
private suit under FLSA § 16(b), intended to establish a policy 
preference for the determination of a wage dispute in judicial 
rather than arbitral proceedings. Indeed, the only policy ex- 
pression of which we are aware, that contained in the Portal- 
to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 251(b), is to the contrary.lo8 
The Tenth Circuit concluded its analysis by reaffirming its 
apparent preference for a preclusion rule. Although the court in 
its summary of the Supreme Court's Gardner-Denver opinion 
recognized the separate origin of contractual and statutory 
rights, it nevertheless was willing to overlook the independent 
origin of those rights provided they arose from the same factual 
occurrence.10e The court apparently favored precluding resort to 
wages and hours are readily adaptable to arbitration. Resort to judicial process after 
arbitration prolongs the controversy and serves no good purpose when the arbitral and 
judicial proceedings arise out of, and must be decided on, the same factual background." 
Id. at  451-52. 
108. 496 F.2d at 451. The court's reasoning on this point is not persuasive. FLSA 
provides for a right to private suit; the right is not qualified or conditioned. Yet the 
Tenth Circuit seems to argue that because Congress did not expressly state, as a matter 
of policy preference, that it found a judicial forum to be superior to an arbitral forum in 
this context, that its expression of intent is somehow less valid. The court does not ex- 
plain why a statutory provision, clear on its face and not constitutionally infirm, should 
not be enforced as Congress intended. Congress is not obligated to explain why it chooses 
one course of action over another or over all others. This is especially true in the instant 
case where the other course of action, i.e., the use of arbitration, first received the strong 
endorsement of the Supreme Court in the 1960 Steelworkers Trilogy-some thirteen 
years after the FLSA was enacted. 
109. The Tenth Circuit stated: 
We hold that when a wage dispute is submitted to arbitration in accor- 
dance with a collective-bargaining agreement, the employees may not thereaf- 
ter maintain an FLSA 16(b) suit for recovery on the basis of the same factual 
occurrence as that presented to the arbitrator. We are convinced that the pol- 
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judicial relief following arbitration because judicial action only 
"prolongs the controversy and serves no good purpose when the 
arbitral and judicial proceedings arise out of, and must be de- 
cided on, the same factual background."l1° 
B. Barrentine 
The Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Sat terwhite was recently 
adopted by the Eighth Circuit in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best 
Freight System, Inc.lll Certiorari has since been granted by the 
Supreme Court. In Barrentine, truck drivers brought suit 
against their employer and union. Count one of the complaint 
was brought under section 16(b) of the FLSA. Count two, 
brought under section 301 of the LMRA, consisted of an allega- 
tion that the union had breached its duty to fairly represent the 
employees in their dispute with the employer.l12 The contro- 
versy arose because of the employer trucking company's policy 
regarding compliance with United States Department of Trans- 
portation regulations governing pre-trip safety inspections.118 No 
driver received pay for the time spent inspecting his vehicle; fur- 
thermore, in the event mechanical defects were discovered, the 
trucking company refused to pay the driver for the actual driv- 
ing time incurred after inspection in taking his truck to the com- 
pany's repair facility.l14 
To challenge this company practice, Barrentine and a fellow 
employee, Scates, submitted formal grievances which were even- 
tually processed through final arbitration and rejected by the 
Id. 
icy of Congress, recognized by the Court., favors the arbitration of disputes 
over wages and hours in accordance with a collective-bargaining agreement. 
The high priority which Congress has given to protection against racial dis- 
crimination has no application to a dispute over rate of pay. The reassertion in 
a judicial forum of the same wage claim determined in an appropriate arbitra- 
tion hinders rather than promotes industrial peace, and should not be 
permitted. 
a t  452. 
110. Id. at 451-52. 
111. 615 F.2d 1194 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 70 (1980). 
112. The Eighth Circuit concluded that because count one of the complaint failed, 
count two automatically failed as well. Id. at 1202. 
113. The Department of Transportation under the authority of the Interstate Com- 
merce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 304 (1976), promulgated the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regu- 
lations. The regulations require, among other things, that drivers inspect specified parts 
and accessories before driving their vehicles, 49 C.F.R. 5 392.7 (1979), and that drivers 
refrain from driving if mechanical defects are discovered, 49 C.F.R. § 396.4 (1979). 
114. 615 F.2d at 1197. 
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joint industry-labor grievance committee.l16 Barrentine and 
Scates were joined by four other drivers, who had not submitted 
grievances, in filing a complaint in the district court. The court 
dismissed the suit with respect to all the plaintiffs, holding that 
the safety-inspection time dispute was properly submitted to ar- 
bitration and fairly decided without a breach of fair representa- 
tion by the union. 
On appeal the Eighth Circuit adopted the Satterwhite dis- 
tinction between wage and discrimination issues. Accordingly, 
the court of appeals concluded that an employee who voluntarily 
submits a wage dispute to grievance-arbitration procedures 
under a collective bargaining agreement cannot later bring a pri- 
vate suit under the FLSA. Concerning the four plaintiffs who 
had not yet submitted grievances, and therefore had not ex- 
hausted their remedies before bringing suit, the court merely cir- 
cumvented the precedent of Leone v. Mobil Oil Corp.ll@ and 
Thompson u. Iowa Beef Packers, Inc.l17 These two cases held 
that where an employee's claim was protected under the FLSA 
and covered under the arbitration clause of a collective bargain- 
ing agreement, the employee need not exhaust his contractual 
remedies before bringing private suit. Because the trial court 
had elected to treat "the case as though each of the named 
plaintiffs had actually filed grievances which were considered 
and denied,"l18 and because the four drivers' trial counsel did 
not object to that approach, the Eighth Circuit merely con- 
cluded that Leone and Thompson were not controlling. 
VII. EXPAND OR LIMIT THE SCOPE OF Gardner-Denver? 
The discussion to this point has attempted to set forth the 
case authority, highlight various lines of reasoning, and portray 
an accurate global view of the controversy over the scope of 
Gardner-Denver-all for the purpose of offering an analysis that 
115. The parties disagree whether the FLSA claim was presented to and considered 
by the grievance committee. The petitioners claim that it was not. "[Tlhere is no indica- 
tion that any claim under the FLSA was presented to, much less considered by, the 
grievance committee." Brief for Petitioners at 5, Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight 
System, Inc., cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 70 (1980). The respondent in turn, "has not and 
does not concede that the FLSA claim of the employees was not submitted to or consid- 
ered by the Grievance Committee." Brief for Respondent a t  1. 
116. 523 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
117. 185 N.W.2d 738 (Iowa 1971), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 405 
U.S. 228 (1972). 
118. 615 F.2d at 1201. 
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might add some clarity and insight to the resolution of this im- 
portant matter. 
The courts that have ruled to expand the scope of Gardner- 
Denver to FLSA and OSHA casesl1@and the courts that have 
ruled to restrict such expansion120 appear to have either missed 
or ignored some of the important issues. The courts in Leone 
and N.L. Industries, for whatever reasons, failed to confront the 
implications raised by the Gateway Coal policy favoring arbitra- 
tion of safety disputes. The Satterwhite and Barrentine courts, 
on the other hand, did not satisfactorily justify their authority 
to eliminate by judicial fiat statutorily created rights. It will be 
helpful to reconstruct the most compelling positions for each 
side by synthesizing some of the strongest arguments pro- 
pounded by the various courts. 
A. Position Favoring Limitation of Gardner-Denver to Title 
VII Cases 
The desirability of limiting the application of the Gardner- 
Denver rationale to Title VII cases is perhaps best demonstrated 
by proposing a two-part balancing test for grievance-arbitration 
cases that involve statutory rights. The test would balance the 
federal policies underlying arbitration against the federal poli- 
cies underlying the statutory scheme in question. The first prong 
of the test would be to identify the specific federal policy (or 
policies) underlying the statute. The second prong would focus 
on whether an arbitral or a judicial forum would be better suited 
for achievement of the stated federal policy. With this informa- 
tion a court could balance the federal policy favoring arbitration 
of labor disputes with the stated federal policy underlying the 
statute. In those instances where a court determines that the 
federal policy underlying the statute would be best promoted 
and protected in an arbitral forum, the inquiry would cease and 
either a deferral or preclusion rule would be adopted. Where a 
court determines, however, that the federal policy underlying a 
statutory scheme is better promoted and protected in a judicial 
rather than an arbitral forum, the court would then decide 
119. Marshall v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 618 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1980); Leone v. Mobil 
Oil Corp., 523 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
120. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 615 F.2d 1194 (8th Cir.), 
cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 70 (1980); Satterwhite v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 496 F.2d 
448 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974). 
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whether Congress deemed either the statutorily based policy or 
the arbitration policy to be relatively more important than the 
other so as to warrant controlling stature. 
The facts and analysis in Gardner-Denver provide a useful 
example for application of this test. The Supreme Court there 
identified the two competing federal policies as that favoring ar- 
bitration of labor disputes and that against discriminatory em- 
ployment practices.121 The Court determined that "arbitration 
makes a less appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII 
issues than the federal courts."122 Factors such as the presence 
of constitutional and statutory issues, the need to refer to public 
law concepts, and the procedural formalities of judicial proceed- 
ings all persuaded the Court that a judicial forum is the superior 
method for resolving Title VII matters. Clearly, these two fed- 
eral policies were at odds with one another, and the Court in its 
attempt to "accommodate" the two policies was likely influenced 
by its earlier determination that Congress considered its "policy 
against discrimination to be of the 'highest priority.' "128 Indeed, 
the Court's sincere desire to accommodate the two policies is ev- 
idenced by the "admissible as evidence" rule found in footnote 
twenty-one of its opinion. 
Quite a different result arguably could be reached, however, 
when the same test is applied to an OSHA rather than a Title 
VII case. In identifying the federal policy behind OSHA, Con- 
gress stated in part: "The Congress declares it to be its purpose 
and policy . . . to assure so far as possible every working man 
and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions 
and to preserve our human resources . . . ."lU The object of 
providing safe and healthful working conditions is arguably most 
effectively furthered by resort to arbitration. This conclusion 
draws its support from the Supreme Court's opinion in Gateway 
Coal where it held that the presumption of arbitrability applies 
to safety disputes. In so holding, the Court emphasized the suit- 
ability of arbitration for the resolution of labor disputes "touch- 
ing the safety of the employees" because of "the special exper- 
tise of the labor arbitrator, with his knowledge of the common 
law of the shop."126 When this determination that the arbitral 
121. 415 U.S. at 59. 
122. Id. at 58 (footnote omitted). 
123. Id. at 47. 
124. 29 U.S.C. 5 651(b) (1976). 
125. 414 US. at 379. 
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forum best advances the federal policy favoring safe and health- 
ful working conditions is coupled with the federal policy favor- 
ing arbitration of labor disputes, the consequence is the adop- 
tion of a deferral or preclusion rule. 
Application of this test to FLSA cases would presumably re- 
quire a result similar to that reached in OSHA cases. In its 
statement of findings under the FLSA, Congress said: 
The Congress hereby finds that the existence, in industries en- 
gaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, 
of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the 
minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, 
and general well-being of workers (1) causes commerce and the 
channels and instrumentalities of commerce to be used to 
spread and perpetuate such labor conditions among the work- 
ers of the several States; ( 2 )  burdens commerce and the free 
flow of goods in commerce; (3) constitutes an unfair method of 
competition in commerce; (4) leads to labor disputes burdening 
and obstructing commerce and the free flow of goods in com- 
merce; and (5) interferes with the orderly and fair marketing of 
goods in commerce.126 
Congress proceeded to declare its policy of correcting and elimi- 
nating as rapidly as practicable the conditions referred to in its 
findings.12' Moreover, a later congressional policy expression in 
the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947128 amended the FLSA in part 
"to protect the right of collective bargaining; and . . . to define 
and limit the jurisdiction of the courts."129 The federal policy 
favoring improvement of substandard labor conditions also ap- 
pears to be an objective that is within the special competence of 
labor arbitrators. If labor disputes touching the safety of em- 
ployees are well-suited to arbitration, then a fortiori, labor dis- 
putes touching wages and hours, which are fundamental provi- 
sions in all collective bargaining agreements, are all the more 
appropriate for resolution through arbitration. In this case, as in 
OSHA cases, there is no conflict between federal policies; on the 
contrary, the federal policy favoring improvement of substan- 
dard labor conditions and the federal policy favoring arbitration 
of labor disputes combine to mandate the conclusion that arbi- 
tration be employed to resolve FLSA disputes. 
126. 29 U.S.C. 5 202(a) (1976) (emphasis added). 
127. Id. at 5 202(b). 
128. 29 U.S.C. $5 251-262 (1976). 
129. Id. at 251(b). 
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It may be contended that this balancing of federal policies 
approach fails to consider the independent statutory basis for 
FLSA and OSHA rights. Admittedly, a preclusion rule does bar 
the exercise of individual statutory rights. A strict deferral rule, 
however, such as the one proposed by the Fifth Circuit in Rios v. 
Reynolds Metal Co.,lM would merely suspend an individual's 
statutory rights in pre-arbitral cases until grievance-arbitration 
processes had been exhausted, or foreclose the exercise of statu- 
tory rights only where a prior arbitration award, meeting partic- 
ularized requirements of fairness, had been awarded. Such a 
strict deferral rule would preserve scarce judicial resources, pro- 
tect the policies underlying the grant of the statutory rights, and 
reserve for labor arbitrators those matters peculiarly within the 
domain of their specialized competence. 
In summary, the position favoring restriction of Gardner- 
Denver to Title VII cases relies upon a two-step balancing test. 
This test first identifies the federal policy underlying the statu- 
tory scheme in question and then determines whether a judicial 
or an arbitral forum is best suited for fulfillment of that statu- 
tory policy. When this test is applied to disputes arising under 
FLSA or OSHA, arbitration accompanied by a strict deferral 
rule emerges as the better method for resolving such conflicts. 
B. Position Favoring Expansion of Gardner-Denver to FLSA 
and OSHA Cases 
The primary reason for extending Gardner-Denver to FLSA 
and OSHA cases is the independent origin of these statutorily 
created rights. The language of the FLSAlS1 and OSHAlS2 provi- 
sions creating procedures for vindication of individual rights in 
federal district courts clearly evidences a congressional intent to 
provide such statutory rights. Furthermore, no FLSA or OSHA 
provision, either express or implied, states that federal courts 
should refrain from granting jurisdiction either permanently (by 
preclusion) or temporarily (by deferral) in cases where violations 
of these statutory rights have allegedly occurred.lM Even though 
130. 467 F.2d 54, 58 (5th Cir. 1972). 
131. 29 U.S.C. 5 216(b) (1976). 
132. 29 U.S.C. 8 660(c) (1976). 
133. It has been argued by the Tenth Circuit that the language in the Portal-to- 
Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. $5 251-262 (1976), provides for the protection of collective bargain- 
ing as well as the definition and limitation of federal court jurisdiction. Satterwhite v. 
United Parcel Service, Inc., 496 F.2d 448 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974). 
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it may be claimed-albeit not necessarily accurately-that judi- 
cial resources are conserved through arbitration or that arbitra- 
tors are better equipped than judges in some areas of expertise, 
the fact remains that arbitrators possess no authorization to ad- 
judicate statutory rights. As the Supreme Court correctly noted 
in Gardner-Denver, the arbitrator's "source of authority is the 
collective-bargaining agreement" and his "task is to effectuate 
the intent of the parties."lS4 Under the FLSA and OSHA statu- 
tory schemes, by contrast, federal district courts receive their 
grant of authority from enacted legislation and it is their task to 
effectuate the intent of Congress. 
In addition to the fact that statutory rights are of indepen- 
dent legal origin, de novo consideration of such rights is essen- 
tial because judicial remedies may provide a broader range of 
relief to secure these important rights. Even where a prior arbi- 
tration award has been granted, judicial remedies may be justi- 
fied to fairly "supplement" the relief awarded. For example, the 
notice remedies and broad injunctive relief granted in Marshall 
v. N.L. Industries, Inc.lL6 could not have been imposed by the 
arbitrator. 
Finally, it should be recognized that the statutory rights 
created under FLSA and OSHA are individual, not collective, 
rights. These statutory rights were specifically created to protect 
individuals, not to influence union-employer relations. It may be 
true that the alleged violation that gives rise to the exercise of 
statutory rights affects many workers, and therefore group 
representation could be effective; but the fact remains that 
Congress granted individual workers the opportunity to seek 
vindication of their rights regardless of action taken by any 
union. 
Accordingly, it may be claimed that such language at  least implies a congressional intent 
that federal courts refrain from granting jurisdiction in FLSA cases. Viewed in its histor- 
ical context, however, it is clear that the Portal-to-Portal legislation was enacted specifi- 
cally to exempt employers and the government from a tremendous, unexpected retroac- 
tive liability which, if imposed, would have crippled this country's economy. The 
limitation of federal court jurisdiction was aimed at  preventing retroactive, not prospec- 
tive liability. If Congress had intended to prohibit prospective liability, it assuredly 
would not have eliminated federal court jurisdiction only with respect to certain FLSA 
claims arising prior to May 14, 1947. See 29 U.S.C. $ 252(a) (1976). The amended FLSA 
retains the right for individual employees to bring private causes of action. 
134. 415 U.S. at 53. 
135. 618 F.2d 1220, 1223 (7th Cir. 1980). 
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C. The Better Position: Extend Gardner-Denver to FLSA 
and OSHA Cases 
The juxtaposition of the two views regarding de novo con- 
sideration of FLSA and OSHA rights serves to accentuate the 
complexity of the issues and the sound arguments that support 
each side. Some of the current commentary in the field has criti- 
cized the Supreme Court's decision in Gardner-DenverlS6 and 
the District of Columbia Circuit's decisionls7 in Leone v. Mobil 
Oil Corp.lM Despite the persuasiveness of those criticisms, the 
commentators fail to explain on what grounds the federal judici- 
ary would be justified in abrogating individual statutory rights 
that were expressly and validly created by Congress. In the ab- 
sence of such explanation, the better position is that Gardner- 
Denver and Leone were correctly decided and, furthermore, that 
de novo considerations of FLSA and OSHA rights is the appro- 
priate and prudent course to follow. 
In addition to the central argument that no justification 
exists for abrogating statutorily created individual rights, other 
reasons support de novo consideration of statutory rights as the 
better position. Professor Feller has noted several obvious 
problems with collective bargaining that weigh in favor of indi- 
vidual statutory rights. First, the majority of American workers 
are not presently union members and thus lack union represen- 
tation. Secondly, experience demonstrates that individual and 
minority interests are not always protected by unions. Finally, 
society and its elected representatives may deem some interests 
to be too fundamental to be entrusted to private collective 
bargaining. la@ 
Other commentators have advanced the argument that the . 
adjudication of statutory rights by arbitrators will distort or di- 
minish the development of public law rights.140 Harry T. Ed- 
136. Oppenheim, Gateway & Alexander, Whither Arbitration?, 48 TUL. L. REV. 973, 
986-88 (1974); Comment, Federal Courts-Labor Arbitration-Employment Discrimi- 
nation-Federal Courts as Primary Protectors of Title VII Rights, 28 RUT. L. REV. 162, 
189-90 (1974). 
137. 10 GA. L. REV. 843 (1976). 
138. 523 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
139. Feller, The Impact of External Law Upon Labor Arbitration, in n$ FUTURE 
OF ARBITRATION IN AMERICA 83, 87-88 (American Arbitration Association 1976). 
140. Christensen, Private Judges-Public Rights: The Role of Arbitration in the 
Enforcement of the National Labor Relations Act, in THE FUTURE OF ARBITRATION IN 
AMERICA 49 (J. Correge, V. Hughes & M. Stone eds. 1976); At the Crossroads, note 53 
supra. 
3611 FLSA AND OSHA 393 
wards has concluded that arbitration is "not a suitable forum for 
the disposition of Title VII or any other important public law 
issues."141 Edwards based his conclusion on the results of a sur- 
vey taken of two hundred members of the National Academy of 
 arbitrator^:'^^ 
The evidence as to whether and how many arbitrators are pro- 
fessionally competent to decide legal issues in cases involving 
claims of employment discrimination is at best mixed. Further- 
more, even assuming, arguendo, that most arbitrators are pro- 
fessionally competent to decide such issues, the nature of the 
arbitration process often will not allow for full and adequate 
consideration of an employee's Title VII rights. Finally, the ev- 
idence from the survey suggests that even when arbitrators are 
professionally competent to decide legal issues and when the 
arbitration process is adequate to allow for full consideration of 
legal questions arising pursuant to Title VII, still many arbitra- 
tors believe that they have no business interpreting or applying 
a public statute in a contractual grievance dispute.148 
This notion that "[plublic law is for public tribunals to de- 
fine""' was recognized by the Supreme Court in Gardner-Den- 
ver when it stated that arbitration is a less appropriate forum 
for resolution of Title VII rights because the primary responsi- 
bility for resolution of constitutional and statutory issues lies 
with the courts.14s Although OSHA and FLSA rights may not 
involve the constitutional issues that Title W rights raise, they 
nonetheless touch important statutory issues that "frequently 
can be given meaning only by reference to public law con- 
c e p t ~ . " ~ ~ ~  Edwards correctly points out that two principal dan- 
gers arise when arbitrators undertake to decide issues of public 
law: "The first is that they may be wrong. The second is that 
their errors, if honored by a public tribunal out of deference to 
arbitration, may distort the development of precedent."14' 
The concern over arbitrators deciding issues of public law is 
heightened in light of the emerging doubt as to the advantages 
141. At the Crossroads, supra note 53, at 78 (emphasis added). 
142. Edwards, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases, in PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE 2 8 ~ ~  ANNUAL  MEETING OF THE NATIONAL CADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 55-92 (BNA, 
Inc. 1975). 
143. Id. at 82. 
144. At the Crossroads, supra note 53, at 91. 
145. 415 U.S. at 56, 57. 
146. Id. at 57 (emphasis added). 
147. At the Crossroads, supra note 53, at 90. 
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of arbitral versus judicial proceedings. A number of commenta- 
tors are marshalling convincing evidence to dispel some of the 
traditional notions concerning the efficacy and desirability of ar- 
bitration. One distinguished critic, Paul R. Hays, asserts that 
neither the writings of Dean Schul~nanl~~ nor those of Archibald 
Cox,14@ which were relied upon by Justice Douglas in writing the 
Steelworkers Trilogy opinions,'" actually provide authority for 
the propositions on arbitration set forth in those cases.lS1 Hays 
states the thesis of his book as follows: 
It  is the submission of this book that there is no authority to 
support the view of arbitration adopted in the Steelworkers 
cases. There have been no extensive studies of the arbitration 
process that would establish the validity of the propositions 
advanced in those cases. While, with overwhelming modesty, 
the Court attributed to the arbitrators enormously superior ex- 
pertise in cases arising under collective agreements, the Court 
impliedly claimed for itself an extensive knowledge and under- 
standing of the arbitration process-a knowledge and under- 
standing which the Court could hardly have in light of the 
148. See Schulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 Hmv. L. 
REV. 999 (1955). 
149. See Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HAW. L. REV. 1482, 1498-99 
(1959). 
150. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). 
151. Specifically, Hays contends: 
Dean Schulman's Holmes lecture is cited in the Steelworkers cases to sup- 
port a number of propositions with respect to arbitration. A careful reading of 
the passages cited will reveal, I believe, that, favorable as Schulman was to the 
arbitration process, his comments do not support the propositions for which 
they are cited. Nor can Schulman's lecture be properly cited in connection with 
the holdings of the Steelworkers cases. For the Court's remarks on the nature 
of the collective agreement and on arbitration are incidental to the holding 
that agreements to arbitrate and arbitration awards are fully enforceable in the 
federal courts, while central to Schulman's thesis of the acceptability of arbi- 
tration awards was the submission that arbitration agreements and awards 
should not be enforceable in the courts. 
. . . .  
If the attitude toward labor arbitration which characterizes the Steelwork- 
ers cases finds little or no support in Schulman's writing or in his position, the 
other authority on whom principal reliance is placed, Professor Archibald Cox, 
affords even less ground for the result. His writings on the subject, if read in 
their entirety, not only do not support the Court's position, they demonstrate 
that Cox takes a position contrary to that of the Court in several important 
respects. 
P. HAYS, LABOR ARBITRATION 7-9 (1966). 
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available material on arbitration.lS2 
In persuasive fashion, Hays attacks the widely circulated 
beliefs that parties select arbitrators on the basis of their special 
competence,1s3 that arbitrators possess particular expertise,lS4 
and that the cost and time savings of the arbitral process far 
exceed those of judicial proceedings.1ss The soundness of Hays' 
conclusions are buttressed by those of Edwards and others.'" 
Finally, to convincingly argue that de novo consideration of 
FLSA and OSHA rights is the better position, satisfactory ex- 
planations must be given for two arguments. The first argument 
is the equitable one articulated by the district court in Gardner- 
Denver, where it reasoned that it would be unfair to allow an 
employee to submit his claim to both arbitral and judicial fo- 
rums and then bind only the employer to the arbitral award. 
The court refused to "accept a philosophy which gives the em- 
ployee two strings to his bow when the employer has only one," 
and thought an employee's later resort to a judicial forum would 
undermine the employer's incentive to arbitrate, thereby sound- 
ing "the death knell for arbitration clauses in labor contracts."lm 
The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court's reasoning 
since it concluded that " 'a no-strike obligation, express or im- 
plied, is the quid pro quo for an undertaking by the employer to 
submit grievance disputes to the process of arbitration.' "lm The 
Court further observed that the benefits derived by employers 
from no-strike provisions are so valuable that they offset 
whatever costs may be encountered by allowing employees an 
arbitral remedy in addition to relief granted pursuant to their 
statutory rights. 
Only time and closer examination will reveal whether the 
reasoning of the district court or that of the Supreme Court is 
correct. It is true that back pay, court costs, and attorneys fees 
provisions under FLSA and OSHA might induce more employ- 
ees to exercise their statutory rights,'" but it is also true that 
Id. at 9. 
Id. at 37-39. 
Id. at 58-59. 
Id. at 60. 
At the Crossroads, supra note 53, at 92-93. 
346 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Colo. 1971). 
415 U.S. at 55 (quoting Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 
(1970)). 
See 29 U.S.C. $ 216(b) (1976) (FLSA); 29 U.S.C. 5 660(c)(2) (1976) (OSHA). 
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there is little evidence to suggest that employers are moving in 
the wake of the Gardner-Denver decision to delete arbitration 
clauses from their collective bargaining agreements. 
The second argument to be addressed is that the Gateway 
Coal presumption of arbitrability of safety disputes extends to 
many OSHA and FLSA cases. The simple answer is that Gate- 
way Coal is distinguishable on its facts. Since no statutory rights 
were involved in that case, it should not stand as a bar to de 
novo adjudication of OSHA rights. 
For these reasons, de novo consideration of statutory rights 
is the sounder position in terms of both law and policy. Conse- 
quently, if the extension of the Gardner-Denver rationale to 
FLSA and OSHA rights is the better position, then the logical 
conclusion would be to apply the Gardner-Denver holding with 
its accompanying "admissible as evidence" caveat to FLSA and 
OSHA cases involving arbitration awards. The arguments favor- 
ing arbitration of wage, hours, health, or safety disputes may 
sway judges to in fact accord great weight to arbitral decisions 
that provide adequate due process protections and evidence full 
and accurate consideration of an employee's statutory rights. On 
the other hand, in pre-arbitral cases involving statutory rights, 
de novo consideration could be allowed without requiring an em- 
ployee to exhaust all other remedies. A necessary adjunct would 
be the elimination of the Collyer doctrine to the extent that it 
requires deferral of cases involving FLSA and OSHA rights. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes has 
become deeply engrained in the fiber of American labor rela- 
tions. The NLRB has promoted arbitration by adopting liberal 
deferral standards in both pre-arbitral and post-arbitral cases. 
Undoubtedly, arbitration would have continued as the preferred 
method for resolving most labor-related disputes if the Supreme 
Court had not trimmed back the contours of the presumption of 
arbitrability in Gardner-Denver. The Gardner-Denver holding 
rests on the following propositions: (1) Congress vested the fed- 
eral courts with plenary power to enforce the provisions of Title 
VII, (2) Congress intended to provide individuals with overlap- 
ping remedies, (3) arbitrators possess no authority to adjudicate 
statutory rights, and (4) a judicial forum is superior to an arbi- 
tral forum for the protection of such rights. 
In the absence of definitive Supreme Court statements re- 
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garding statutory rights other than Title VII rights, it remains 
uncertain whether the Court will also permit independent de 
novo consideration of FLSA and OSHA rights. The question 
whether to extend or limit the Gardner-Denver rationale is a 
very difficult one. Sound legal and policy considerations support 
each side. Nonetheless, the better position is to expand Gard- 
ner-Denver and allow de novo consideration in federal courts of 
FLSA and OSHA rights. This is the more prudent course for 
several reasons. First, Congress expressly created these individ- 
ual causes of action and has authorized the federal judiciary to 
protect them, not to abrogate or qualify them. In addition, these 
statutorily created rights are strictly individual and not collec- 
tive in nature, which means that they may be vindicated inde- 
pendent of union action. Also, because of the importance of the 
public law concepts and statutory issues that exist in many 
FLSA and OSHA cases, a judicial forum is a more suitable fo- 
rum for the resolution of such matters. Finally, the efficacy of 
arbitration as a vehicle of dispute resolution is being seriously 
questioned because of mounting concerns about the expense and 
duration of the arbitral process as well as the competence of ar- 
bitrators. Wisdom dictates that these questions be carefully in- 
vestigated and resolved before individual statutory rights are 
impaired. 
John A. Adarns 
